

14 December 1951

Memorandum for: The Director

From: Legislative Counsel

Subject: Intelligence references in
the "MacArthur Hearings". Part 2.

Reference is made to Memorandum for the Director, dated 5 July 1951, subject as above, which includes extracts dealing with the subject of intelligence generally and CIA in particular from hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate. These hearings dealt with the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area.

Part 2 includes the testimony of General Bradley and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Page numbers are those in the final printed text of the hearings.

Walter L. Pforzheimer

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Testimony of General of the Army
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

"Senator Wiley. Is it not true that the Government had intelligence that Chinese Red troops stationed opposite Formosa were moving north some time before they entered the war; and that you had that intelligence, did you not?

"General Bradley. Yes, Sir.

"Senator Wiley. Did you inform MacArthur?

"General Bradley. I am told that all of that information was sent to General MacArthur. However, the agent who does that is General Collins, in the Army, who acts as executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"He has prepared a very thorough analysis of what information was furnished to General MacArthur, and General MacArthur's headquarters, and he will be prepared to give you that when he comes before your committee. He can give it to you in a lot more detail than I can.

"Senator Wiley. Will he also be able to give us the general, over-all picture as to the information that was sent to MacArthur, from world sources, as to the subject -- whether Red China would intervene in this battle, or not?

"General Bradley. I think he can tell you any information that we had at that time, on the subject, and just what was passed on to General MacArthur.

"Senator Wiley. Well, but you, as Chief of Staff, must have been formulating your plans, and must have had some information on that subject, so I am going to ask you the question: What information did you have, and when did you get it, if you did get it, that was communicated to you people, as to the possibility of the Red Chinese intervening in this conflict?

"General Bradley. Well, for a considerable time prior to their actual contact with our troops in Korea, we had information that they were concentrating additional troops in Manchuria, some of them moved up from the south, of course, we had that information for some time. ...

"Senator Wiley. Really the question that I would like to get the information on is what intelligence did you have indicating that they were going to enter this war?

"General Bradley. We had no intelligence that they were going to enter the war. We had the intelligence that they were concentrating in Manchuria. You can only then consider their capabilities. They had the capability of intervening in the war.

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"Senator Wiley. If the Intelligence Department of this Government had that information, you would have had it right off the bat, wouldn't you?

"General Bradley. Yes.

"Senator Wiley. So we have got that straightened around. There was no intelligence given to you people by any one of the intelligence forces in this Government that the Red Chinese were going to enter this war.

"General Bradley. No, sir. We had the information that they had that capability and we always had the thought that they might enter it, but we did not have any intelligence to the positive effect that they were going to intervene. . ." (Page 758 and 759).

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"Senator Hunt. . . . I have before me here a report of proceedings of a hearing that was held before the Armed Services Committee on April 16, and as a basis for the questions I want to read briefly from the statement of General Cabell. He said:

'Mr. Chairman, there is no single development in the postwar period that has been more charged with significance for the security of the United States than steps taken by the Soviet Union to build a stockpile of atomic bombs and an air arm capable of delivering them against the United States.'

"Now, General, at this hearing, we were briefed by General Cabell, who is Director of Intelligence for the United States Air Force, and a gentleman by the name of Lester Kullenberg, who is Director of Operational Research Division of the Civilian Defense Administration, and Mr. James J. Wadsworth, who spoke very briefly. I believe he is a deputy to General Cabell. . . .

"General Bradley. Well, again, Senator, I have never made a detailed study. These people in the civil defense have, and the people here interested in the effects of bombs and development of the sizes of them certainly go into that. Whether or not those figures are accurate within 1 percent or 10 percent, I wouldn't know. But I think we must all realize that Russia has the bomb. How many we can only estimate from certain sources of information. She has the ability to deliver them. She has planes with the necessary range to deliver them. . . .

"We also must concede that they have every means of finding out where our industries are. They must have a very fine target folder for each one of them, and that should enable them to deliver the bombs on the target." (Pages 944 and 945).

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"Senator Brewster. General MacArthur made the point on logistics which gets somewhat away from battles. He believed that the Siberian Railway was being taxed to its limit to supply the present operations. Has that been given consideration?

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"General Bradley. Yes, sir. Every intelligence estimate we make of the Far East must take into consideration the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and of the shipping which comes around during the summer, around the north; we also take into consideration the war industries which have been built up in the Far East in order to remove and relieve that road of some of its load in case of war. All of those things are taken into consideration." (Pages 1002 and 1003).

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"Senator Smith. Now, let me ask two more, and then I am through.

"MacArthur has been charged by some people with whom I have discussed this matter with falling down at the time the Chinese Communists came in. They felt that he ought to have known they were coming and it was a terrible blunder on his part that he didn't know; therefore he ought to get out for that one thing alone.

"What I want to ask is: Did our military intelligence fall down so that we were not adequately alerted to the aggression of the Chinese Communists in Korea?

"If it fell down, was it MacArthur's intelligence staff, or was it the CIA in Washington, or where was it?

"Could you say, as a military man, whether MacArthur was to blame for the apparently wrong intelligence in the Chinese coming into North Korea?

"General Bradley. The intelligence on which he had to base his decision had to be primarily field intelligence.

"Now, there were evidences from captured prisoners of from late October, that Chinese had come in to some extent into the operation.

"Then, on November 6 General MacArthur sent in a message that the Chinese were pouring across the bridges across the Yalu, and they were coming across in great numbers. That was on about November 6.

"Now, what happened between November 6 and the time that he was hit by the Chinese attack of about November 26 or 28 -- the 26th, I guess -- it is hard for us here to know, because a lot of that intelligence should have come from his own field command.

"That concentration on the right flank of the Eighth Army should have been picked up by air reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance; in other words, by patrol and aviation put in there.

"How much of that he had, Senator Smith, we don't know here, because we don't get all the field intelligence that a commander gets in the field and acts on. But certainly there was enough coming in to indicate that there was a considerable Chinese build-up somewhere in North Korea.

"Senator Smith. Was MacArthur prevented from sending reconnaissance planes across the border in Manchuria to see whether there were accumulations there of troops?

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"General Bradley. We knew all the time that there were concentrations in Manchuria. It was a question of how many of them had moved over into Korea, and that, as I say, could have been obtained or should have been obtained by air reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance.

"Now, you must realize, of course, also that the country in there is very heavily wooded by evergreens, and it is rather difficult to pick up troops and, as I say, it is very hard to sit here in Washington and say he should have known or just what he did know. That is up to the field commander, and I certain would not blame him or G-2 or anyone else for the fact he did not get it, and the fact that he may have had certain information and may have evaluated it wrong.

"Senator Smith. Let me ask you this, General: What provision have we got here in Washington for getting in touch with world conditions, with the situation in Peiping, and with the probable policy of the Chinese Communists? Do we get intelligence through our offices here about that that could have been or should have been transmitted to him?

"General Bradley. He is transmitted all the information we get in here. Of course, you have to evaluate it. We get a lot of reports out of China; some of them are absolutely wrong, some of them have a certain amount of truth in them; and we have to take all of them and evaluate them, and I believe all of these messages were sent to General MacArthur, and I have asked General Collins to be prepared to testify on that because he is the executive agent who passes on to General MacArthur's headquarters all the intelligence information, and he would be able to tell you this, and I know he has looked into it, and he will tell you exactly what he has sent." (Pages 1035, 1036 and 1037).

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"Senator Hickenlooper. The thing that bothers me is when we retreat, it is very difficult to count the number of casualties, because we are retreating away from the ground where the casualties exist. How do you know how many wounded they have?

"What is our basis for estimating those casualties?

"I am merely trying to test whether or not we are getting any kind of accurate information as to their casualties, based on any actual count, or whether it is merely guesswork.

"General Bradley. They are not altogether guesses. They come from these pictures we take, from prisoners, from agents who are back in behind them, some civilian informants.

"They are supposed to be a summation of all these sources of information." (Page 1080).

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"Senator Cain. ... General Bradley, I understood you to say several days ago that you would check your telephone log to determine if possible who called you to notify you that the President was considering the removal of General MacArthur. Have you had an opportunity to do that?

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"General Bradley. I believe I stated later I had checked it and it does not show. The point was made here then that that probably came over the White House phone, but I should make it clear that a lot of people use the White House phone. It isn't just the White House that uses it.

"For example, Admiral Sherman has a White House phone and most of the time I call Admiral Sherman over the White House phone, because it is more secure. I call Mr. Lovett and the Secretary of Defense calls me over that phone." (Page 1136).

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Testimony of General J. Lawton Collins
Chief of Staff, United States Army

"Chairman Connally. . . . Now, what is your view as to the intelligence that we have had in Korea? First, is it the function of the Army out there to have its intelligence organization or is it dependent on our intelligence here?

"General Collins. Prior to the time that our forces went into Korea, General MacArthur had no responsibility for the intelligence on the mainland of Asia.

"After he assumed command, he was placed in command of our forces in Korea, he did have the responsibility for the collection and evaluation of all intelligence emanating from the field.

"We furnished him from Washington all of the information that we were able to garner in various sources -- from various sources -- as rapidly as we could do so.

"Chairman Connally. Before the Red Chinese intervention, it was pretty well thought that the war was over -- those were our reports here, were they not?

"General Collins. Well, General MacArthur hoped he could clear up the situation in a very short time."
(Pages 1190 and 1191).

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"Senator McMahon. . . . Now, General, you, of course, have been familiar with the intelligence reports concerning operations in the Far East as Chief of Staff?

"General Collins. Yes.

"Senator McMahon. I would like to have you tell me, General, what intelligence you had that indicated to you that the Chinese were going to intervene or might intervene in Korea.

"General Collins. Well, that intelligence, practically all of it, came from the Far Eastern Command itself. I have a summary of an exchange of cables between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early November which has considerable relevancy to the Far East Command's intelligence coverage of Chinese intervention in Korea.

"On the 6th of November, in a cable requesting permission to bomb the Yalu River bridges, General MacArthur stated -- I don't know whether this is a paraphrase or not, so I think it should be reviewed by whoever is reviewing the testimony here:

'Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command.'

"Senator McMahon. That, General, is after the Chinese actually intervened,

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"General Collins. No, sir; this is on the 6th of November. The main Communist, Chinese Communist attack, was on the 24th of November.

"Senator McMahon. But if these Chinese were pouring over the bridges of the Yalu into Korea, then they were in the process of intervention at that time.

"General Collins. Yes, sir; they were getting ready to intervene, you might say. Actually, of course, their crossing the frontier was an intervention, but this is before they actually appeared in force as located by military troops in the field. These were picked up by air reconnaissance, I assume.

"Senator McMahon. General, could I interrupt you to say that I am interested more in the interval between September and November than I am in the situation of --

"General Collins. I see.

"Senator McMahon (continuing). November 6.

"You see, what I am trying to get at is this: What information was available to you here as to whether or not the Chinese were going to come in?

"Now, as I recollect it, General, in September they began to move their troops up the China coast in the direction of Korea, began that movement. That was known to you, was it not?

"General Collins. Yes, sir.

"Senator McMahon. And that was known to General MacArthur?

"General Collins. Yes, sir.

"Senator McMahon. In other words, they were putting them in a position to march down into Korea as early as September?

"General Collins. Yes, sir; they were.

"We began to get some more threatening evidence of possible Communist intervention in early October, from about the 27th of September, on through October.

"Senator McMahon. What was the nature of that advice?

"General Collins: Well, Mao Tze-tung and Chou en-lai made public statements of a threatening character.

"I was trying to see if I could locate them.

"Colonel Gilchrist tells me that we have got some brief intimations as early as July that there were possibilities that the Chinese would come up to intervene; but they were moving north, whether they would cross the frontier or merely go into Manchuria to safeguard a possible invasion from Korea, there was no indication.

"Senator McMahon. What was the nature of that intelligence?

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"General Collins. I don't have the thing at my finger tips.

"I think there were various reports from Chinese Nationalist sources, as I recall it, and frankly many of these advices that we have had from Chinese Nationalist sources had proved to be erroneous, a goodly portion, if not a majority.

"Senator McMahon. Now, were there other communications to the Joint Chiefs from the Intelligence Agency?

"General Collins. There was a series of them, an intelligence summary, which came from the Far Eastern Command, now, because that is where we got most of our intelligence. Ninety percent of it came from right out there in the theater.

"Senator McMahon. You mean from General MacArthur's command and not from the Central Intelligence Agency?

"General Collins. That is General MacArthur's sources, under General Willoughby.

"Senator McMahon. Can we have from you, sir, a summary of the messages that you got from the theater commander relative to the intention of the Chinese to intervene?

"General Collins. Yes, sir; I think that could be furnished. It would be rather voluminous. This paper I have here actually is an analysis of the various stages of intelligence. You see it is a quarter of an inch thick.

"Senator McMahon. I think that should be furnished, General, for the appendix, that we should have a summary, which might have to be censored, too --

"General Collins. I feel certain this ought to be censored.

"Senator McMahon. Which would indicate that the theater commander had in his possession the intelligence to demonstrate the likelihood of the Chinese intervention if we went to the Yalu.

"General Collins. I wouldn't say necessarily that it was a likelihood, Senator, but it certainly would represent a capability.

"Senator McMahon. And something upon which a judicious man would take precautions, suitable precautions, General.

"General Collins. Well, I think that General MacArthur did take precautions.

"Senator McMahon. What was the nature of these precautions?

"General Collins. Well, he pushed ahead reconnaissances. One way to get intelligence was to push troops

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forward to make contact with the enemy, and he did that. As he approached the Yalu, he sent columns out ahead of the main body to determine whether or not there were any forces that were out in front of him." (Pages 1233, 1234 and 1235).

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"Senator Saltonstall. Did General MacArthur have all the intelligence out there that you had here? In other words, did you transmit to him all the intelligence?

"General Collins. To the best of my knowledge; yes, sir.

"Senator Saltonstall. Now it was current around here, certainly, that the English and the Indians had intimated that the Chinese would come down if we came too near the Manchurian border. Was there any actual intelligence on that?

"General Collins. We were furnished that information by the Far Eastern Command.

"Senator Saltonstall. That came from --

"General Collins. Came from the Far Eastern Command here.

"Senator Saltonstall. To you?

"General Collins. Yes, sir. That is one source, and then we got it also from India direct. But we had a message to that effect from FECOM.

"Senator Saltonstall. So that rumor, if not better than a rumor, was current then?

"General Collins. Yes, sir.

"Senator Saltonstall. At least everybody knew that might happen?

"General Collins. Yes, sir. (Page 1268).

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"Senator Hickenlooper. Even substantial and spottedly organized strong guerilla movements, with equipment, on the mainland would probably lessen that pressure and draw Communist troops down to cope with it.

"General Collins. Not necessarily. The Chinese have enough forces down in that area to cope with guerrilla operations, in my judgment, and it would not necessarily follow that they would have to pull anything out from Manchuria to cope with that type of guerrilla warfare." (Page 1326).

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Testimony of General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

"Senator Smith, Now can you clear up in my mind what you mean by the expression 'air reconnaissance' as distinguished from 'air bombing'? Is there a distinction? I am referring now to the famous statement or study of January 12 of the Joint Chiefs where one of their points was:

'remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.'

"That was under certain conditions that did come to pass later. And MacArthur in his address to the joint session used the same expression --

'Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.'

"Does that mean just exploration journeys to see what is going on, or does it mean air reconnaissance from the sense of dropping a bomb here and there?

"General Vandenberg. No, sir; that means surveillance of bases and coastal cities both by means of visual observation and by photographs of areas in Manchuria and along the coast of China. It means keeping tab on possible build-ups, changes in composition of forces in the areas to the extent that it is practicable to get them from the air.

"Senator Smith. Well, wouldn't that be a great help for any man in the field, in determining the masses that might have been coming down from Manchuria through the Yalu?

"General Vandenberg. Yes; it would have been of considerable assistance.

"In the area north of the Yalu, there has been, from time to time, and especially in the early days, reports of North Koreans who had once been in North Korea, who had gone into Manchuria and who had been recruited and were being trained in Manchuria for operations against the South Koreans.

"Those people were coming across the Yalu at intervals, and in varying degrees of force, almost from the initiation of hostilities.

"When the Chinese appeared, from the air it would have been difficult to distinguish, in a photograph, for example, or by visual observation, at relatively high speed and at relatively high altitude, whether or not they were Chinese Communists or more North Koreans.

"On the other hand, it would have been helpful in getting estimates of numbers which would verify or throw out the intelligence that was obtained from other sources about their location and numbers.

"It is an additional factor of assistance to the commander.

"Senator Smith, Would you tell me why we didn't use air just before the big Chinese Communist push when we were moving up into the North Korean area, initially, back

there just before Christmas when we thought they might 'get the boys home before Christmas'?

"Why weren't we using air to tell whether the masses were liable to come across and attack? What was the real difficulty with our intelligence?

"We have heard testimony that the intelligence of the commander in the field fell down, and it was also said that we had information in Washington that, if it could have been supplied, might have helped.

"I am wondering just what was the reason for that fall-down in intelligence?

"General Vandenberg. Senator, intelligence is largely, in that instance, one of the Army forces. The Air Force gets into it as an adjunct to the normal intelligence activities.

"I would say that whatever testimony General Bradley or General Collins would care to give on the subject, would probably be more knowing than mine, about that particular point.

"Senator Smith. What troubled me was this:

"I understood, of course, when we were told that our ground forces were not allowed across the Yalu. We understood that.

"Was there any reason why our airplanes should not have gone across the Yalu to determine the enemy concentrations, even though we were limited and were not allowed to drop bombs? Why shouldn't the planes have gone over and at least given us the benefit of their knowledge of enemy concentrations?

"General Vandenberg. Senator, we now get into another complicated area of how far do we go, and what good do we get out of it.

"Reconnaissance aircraft are generally, usually, unarmed, high altitude, fast-moving aircraft ---

"Senator Smith. That is what I understood.

"General Vandenberg. Who take pictures, penetrate into hostile territory, and attempt to get back.

From very early on, we had indications that the air warning system north of the Yalu and extending down fairly well about to Pyongyang, was being operated quite efficiently.

"We found out that our aircraft going up toward the Yalu were always met by hostile fighters. To operate successfully your reconnaissance airplanes over a period of time you have to more or less gain either air superiority in an area or have a feint to draw off that hostile opposition.

"You can get through flights from time to time with the information. In order to be of any value, to really spot these people, take photographs on successive days, find out how far they have moved, find out what the build-up is, you have to do it over a considerable period of time; and, while I think it would have been helpful undoubtedly to General MacArthur, I do not believe that with the other sources of intelligence that he had available to him, that air intelligence alone would have been decisive.

"For example, there were indications early on from other than air intelligence that the Chinese Communists were moving up the coast from southern China. Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120006-3

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along that there were masses along the Yalu River; but the big problem was what their intent was.

"I doubt if you could have gotten the intent by aerial reconnaissance. That was a combination of political intelligence, diplomatic intelligence, and military intelligence behind, as someone has described it, a bamboo curtain instead of an iron curtain.

"I believe that is all I can add to it, sir. I think it would have been helpful to some degree, but whether it would have furnished General MacArthur with all the intelligence that he would have desired is questionable." (Pages, 1462, 1463 and 1464).

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"Senator Hickenlooper. . . . But, General, I do want to come back to one thing, where I believe you put your finger on a most important situation. On pages 3624 and 3625 you testified with respect to the jet engine, the MIG-15, calling it a superior jet engine, and stating it had been developed. You commented that the Russians had taken German scientists to Russia, and that it is a very excellent engine.

"I think you went so far as to say it is superior to anything we have in that field.

"Now, General, were you assistant to General Eisenhower or a member of, or were you G-2 in late '45 and '46?

"General Vandenberg. It was around that time, Senator. I would have to recall exactly.

"Senator Hickenlooper. General, do you recall a program which I recall very distinctly, because I had just come to Congress at that time in '45 proposing to bring over a substantial number of trained German scientists, under certain inspected conditions, to work in the rocket programs and jet propulsion and synthetic products and matters of that kind, because we had discovered that in certain fields they were way ahead of us at the close of the war? Do you remember that proposal?

"General Vandenberg. I recall the general subject; yes, sir.

"Senator Hickenlooper. I would suggest this, and I may be wrong about it, according to your recollection: That the Armed Forces -- that is, the Army and Navy at that time -- were very anxious to bring over as many as a thousand of those well-trained and provenly successful German scientists to give us the benefit of their advanced learning in certain fields, which would have been very important to our jet developments and to our synthetic processes and other things in the field of national defense.

"Am I wrong about that? The number of a thousand may not be exactly right, but I recall it, and whatever evidence I have here indicates that a thousand was approximately the number.

"General Vandenberg. The gist of your remarks from my recollection is right.

"Senator Hickenlooper. My own recollection, aided by a memorandum which I have here of somewhat near that time, is that the military forces of this country were very zealous to do this. I thoroughly approved at the time, although I wasn't directly

in connection with it, but I knew something about it and I thoroughly approved, and I think a great many people on the Hill approved at that time.

"Is it fair to say, according to your memory, General Vandenberg, that one man in the State Department put such blocks and hindrances in the way of bringing those German scientists over here that we never got any appreciable number of them? We did get a few at first, but most of them had to go back, and the program was stopped because of one man's activities in the State Department.

"I am not talking about a Secretary of State; I am talking about one individual in the State Department.

"General Vandenberg. Senator, that is beyond my cognizance; I really don't know.

"I do recall the services, armed services, desiring them. I know that in some few fields, it is my impression that we got some, about that time. Whether the total number was stopped or how many we got or who did it was on a level far above me, sir, and I had no knowledge of it whatsoever.

"Senator Hickenlooper. Were you a member or did you work on the organization called the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, called the JIOA?

"General Vandenberg. At that date, I would suspect not, sir.

"Senator Hickenlooper. But I was thinking of your being assistant to General Eisenhower, and then being G-2 put you in proximity with that group.

"General Vandenberg. I was General Eisenhower's intelligence officer for about 4 or 5 months, I would guess. I will have to check that time. Then I went to the Central Intelligence Agency. My recollection would be that I did not have, while I was General Eisenhower's G-2, any joint meetings, but I will have to check that.

"Senator Hickenlooper. By any chance, did you happen to be a member of the group of military officials who visited Assistant Secretary of State John Hildring in the fall of 1946 on this proposition of attempting to take out the roadblock which had been apparently thrown in the way of bringing these German scientists over here to teach us things that they had learned and which we did not yet know?

"General Vandenberg. I recall meeting with General Hildring; the exact dates, sir, I doubt if I could even check, because I don't believe I have any record of them. But during the time that I was either in G-2 or in the Central Intelligence Agency, I recall meetings with General Hildring and I would not be surprised but what that subject might have come up.

"Senator Hickenlooper. Well, now, General, I am in thorough accord with that; I was in thorough accord with that program. I am not critical of the Armed Forces. I think they did everything they could to make arrangements whereby this vast lore of scientific knowledge could be made available for our own defense advancement, so I am thoroughly in accord with that.

"I have a memorandum here that was made a short

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time after that period. This memorandum indicates that Assistant Secretary of State Hildring stated that he was unable to cope with the various preventive measures that were thrown in the way of bringing the German scientists here.

"Now, the significance of that is that the Russians, as I think we all know, did take a great many German scientists from Germany over to Russia, who have since been, according to whatever information we have been able to get, working in their scientific activity there. That is quite generally understood; is it not?

"General Vandenberg. That seems to be the general impression, and from what meager information I could get, I would believe that is correct, sir.

"Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

"Now, I raise that question, General -- I raise that question indicating that at least the military, at that time, realized the tremendous value, which they might get, to this country, but according to my information, the completion of that program had a lot to promise for us, but was blocked in the State Department; and I just wondered ---

"Senator Smith. When was that?

"Senator Hickenlooper. It was blocked in 1946 and 1947, and according to my information, permanently blocked thereafter." (Pages 1467, 1468 and 1469).

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Testimony of Admiral Forrest P. Sherman
Chief of Naval Operations

"Senator Stennis. Well, I want to ask your opinion on this, as a military man and a citizen too: You have no doubt that the Russians at least partly inspired that war in Korea; is that your idea about it?

"Admiral Sherman. All of the intelligence that I have is to the effect that the Russians prepared for and instigated the North Korean aggression.

"However, my intelligence in connection with the Chinese Communist aggression is less convincing.

"I have a feeling the North Koreans did exactly what they were told, when they were told, and as they were told to.

"The other affairs was a little more out of control, and still may be, and therefore the independence of it from direct Russian control may eventually be an asset." (Pages 1579 and 1580).

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"Admiral Sherman. Well, sir, I think, as I said yesterday, the first steps were to stop the important items, follow by abetting a general concurrence on an economic blockade, and then, with that condition established, we are then in a position to go forward and say, 'Now we have gone this far, why don't we stop everything by a naval blockade?'

"With reference to the attitude of the British about Hong Kong, I have had no direct association with that problem. I have merely followed the question of shipments from the best information that came to me through my own Intelligence Corps." (Page 1619).

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"Senator Gillette. On another subject, Admiral Sherman, when General MacArthur addressed the joint session of Congress, he stated, referring to the period last November when we had advanced the farthest north, that:

'Our victory was complete. We had hurled back the invaders and dissipated his forces. Our objectives were within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and a situation not contemplated.'

"Do you agree with that statement?

"Admiral Sherman. Well, I agree with all of it except the 'not contemplated,' because that becomes a question of the meaning of the word 'contemplate.'

"I will say this. I had worried about it for a long while, ever since I first heard that the army opposite Formosa was moving into Manchuria, and in October we captured Chinese prisoners and we had in early November, there was a time when General MacArthur was asking to bomb the Yalu bridges because thousands of Chinese were pouring down through Antung and Sinuiju. Our morning reports had trucks bumper to bumper, so I had worried about it.

"Senator Gillette. Well, I am glad indeed that you made that answer because I had been seriously disturbed over a statement of that kind in view of known facts. For instance, you will recall that early last year when Mao went to Moscow for those conferences, there was announced one treaty and undoubtedly there are other secret arrangements. In that treaty the purpose was stated to be an attempt to unify their efforts to prevent a revival of Japanese aggression, and in addition it was announced that as a provision of the treaty the Soviet Union was allowed to use Chinese bases for 3 years.

"Certainly it would be a reasonable implication to deduce from that that there was some changed condition to be contemplated at the end of 3 years with reference to Japan to deprive her of her power of aggression, possibly that she become Communist through internal revolution or through some military effort. Other implications could be drawn in view of the fact you just stated that it was known the troops were being sent north for a build-up across the border, and that the troops were coming into North Korea. In view of all of those things it seemed to me little short of fatuous to assume -- and I was hoping that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not assume -- that they could contemplate some military action of that sort. Do you care to comment on that?

"Admiral Sherman. You will recall here was an exchange of dispatches in November, along in the middle of November about how far north United States troops should be sent. There was a hope that we would stop on some advantageous position short of the border because it was evident that this build-up was taking place in Manchuria, that there had been considerable movement into the border areas inside North Korea, and we felt that we had to proceed very cautiously.

"Senator Gillette. That is reassuring because it indicated to me as a layman when that statement was made, that there was either deplorable lack of intelligence or an inexcusable failure to evaluate intelligence." (Pages 1644 and 1645).

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Walter L. Pforzheimer